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NOTES AND COMMENTS
there is also a requirement that in all cases the solicitor shall "appear
and prosecute the accusation and be responsible for the faithful discharge of the duties required of him." 14 It is submitted that the
statute requires only that charges be initiated or "instituted" by the
grievance committee, and the solicitor, in securing additional affidavits, merely "faithfully discharged" his duties. 15
JAMES M.

LITTLE, JR.

Bankruptcy-Proof of Contingent Claims.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Maynard
v. Elliott' held that the liability of a bankrupt as endorser of negotiable notes, some of which did not mature for more than a year after
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, was a provable claim against
his estate.
Section 63 of the present bankruptcy act in providing for claims
provable against the estate of a bankrupt makes no specific provision
for the proof of contingent claims.2 The status of the claim at the
time of the filing of the petition determines whether or not it is provable.3 Hence the provability of contingent claims founded upon contract depends on whether subdivision (1)4 of this section to the
N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §214.
See People v. Harris, supra note 10.
Cited in appellant's brief were: In re Evans, 130 Pac. 217 (Utah, 1913);
Bar Association v. Sullivan, 185 Cal. 621, 198 Pac. 7 (1921) ; In re Hudson,
36 Pac. 812 (Cal., 1894) ; Grievance Committee v. Ennis, 84 Conn. 594, 80 Atl.
767 (1911) ; and People v. Matthews, 217 Ill. 94, 75 N. E. 444 (1905). Three
of these would seem to be not in point The first decision rests upon the fact
that the petitioners were condemned unheard on charges concerning which no
evidence had been adduced; in the second ease no misconduct other than that
specifically charged was alleged in the accusation or included in charges filed;
and the last reversal was due to the lack of an affidavit to support the information. Nor did the fourth case turn alone on the technical point involved,
since the deficiency in the complaint was only "another reason" for setting
aside the order for suspension.
1283 U. S. 273, 51 Sup. Ct. 390, 75 L. ed. 518 (1931) [reversing 40 F. (2d)
17 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930)].
'30 Stat. 562 (1898) 11 U. S. C. A. §103 (1927). "A contingent claim is one
as to which it remains uncertain, at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, whether or not the bankrupt will ever become liable to pay it." In re
Mullings Clothing Co., 238 Fed. 58, 67 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1916) ; (1927) 12 MiNN.
L. Rav. 60, n. 1.
'Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U. S. 625, 33 Sup. Ct. 365, 57 L. ed. 676 (1913);
Swartz v. Fourth National Bank, 117 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902) ; In re Bingham, 94 Fed. 796 (D. Vt. 1899).
" (A) Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate
which are (1) a fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument
in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition against
him,... Bankruptcy Act, of 1898, mipra note 2.
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effect that a provable claim must be, "a fixed liability ... absolutely
owing at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy," shall
be construed as limiting subdivision (4)5 which provides for the
proof of claims founded upon a contract express or implied.
Prior to the decision in the principal case the proof of contingent
claims was a source of considerable confusion. In the case of Moch
v. Market Street National Bank6 the court permitted proof of a claim
against a bankrupt as indorser of negotiable notes due after the filing
of the petition on the ground that subdivision (1) and (4) are to be
construed as separate and independent; hence though contingent and
not provable under subdivision (1), the claim is provable under subdivision (4) as founded upon contract. This constructiou of the
statute was followed by a majority of the lower federal courts as regards claims on the indorsement of negotiable notes due after the
filing of the petition. 7 By an opposite construction of the statute
claims for rent to accrue after the filing of the petition were by the
8
I;
weight of authority held contingent and therefore not provable.
9
10
re Roth & Appel, again representing the majority view, held that
a claim based on a stipulation in the lease giving the lessor the right
to terminate the lease upon the bankruptcy of the lessee and hold the
lessee for the difference between the contract price and the re-rental
value of the premises was not provable because contingent, the court
'(A) Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate
which are .... (4) founded upon an open account, or upon a contract express
or implied. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 2.
'107
Fed. 897 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1901).
T
In re Phillip Semmer Glass Co., 135 Fed. 77 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1905) ; It re
Rothenburg, 140 Fed. 798 (S. D. N. Y. 1905) ; In re Smith, 146 Fed. 923 (D. R.
I. 1906) ; In re Amdur Shoe Co., 13 F. (2d) 147 (D. Mass. 1926) ; In re Henry
& S. G. Lindeman, 238 Fed. 639 (S. D. N. Y. 1916); In re Gerson, 105 Fed.

891 (E. D. Pa. 1901) ; In re Shatz, 251 Fed. 351 (E. D. Pa. 1918) ; In re T. A.

McIntyre & Co., 198 Fed. 579 (S. D. N. Y. 1912) ; In re Buzzini & Co., Inc.,
183 Fed. 827 (S. D. N. Y. 1910); see Heyman v. Third National Bank of

Jersey City, 216 Fed. 685, 687 (D. N. J. 1914). Contra: First National Bank
v. Elliott, 19 F. (2d) 426 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) (the Moch case expressly disapproved).

'In re Rubel, 166 Fed. 131 (E. D. Wis. 1908); In re Mlle. Lemaud, Inc.,
13 F. (2d) 208 (D. Mass. 1926); Wells v. 21st St. Realty Co., 12 F. (2d) 237
(C. C. A. 6th, 1926) ; Britton v. Western Iowa Co., 9 F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A.
8th, 1925); Coleman v. Withoft, 195 Fed. 250 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921) Contra:
In re Spies-Alper Co., 231 Fed. 535 (D. N. J. 1916). (the Moch case expressly

followed); Courtney v. Fidelity Trust Co., 219 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914).
'181 Fed. 667 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1910).
"°Watson v. Merrill, 136 Fed. 359 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905) ; In re Ells, 98 Fed.
967 (D. Mass. 1910); Slocum v. Soliday, 183 Fed. 410 (C. C. A. 1st, 1910).
Contra: In re Caloris Mfg. Co., 179 Fed. 722 (E. D. Pa. 1910) (the Moch case
expressly followed).
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attempting to distinguish the Moch case on its facts. However, an
acceleration clause which provides that in the event of the bankruptcy
of the lessee the lease shall terminate and all rent become immediately due creates a liability fixed and owing at the time of the filing
of the petition and is provable."1
Provisions for the collection of attorney's fees in notes of the
bankrupt maturing subsequent to the filing of the petition have been
held not provable as contingent ;12 guaranty contracts made by the
bankrupt where the principal obligation had not been breached before
the filing of the petition have been held not provable because contingent ;13 while a surety contract under the same circumstances has
14
been held provable even though contingent.
The field of contingent claims provable under section 63 was considerably widened when the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy
could be considered as an anticipatory breach of an executory contract, creating a claim immediately due, founded upon contract and
provable as such. 15 Under this decision the test of provability for
claims
claims of this nature is very comprehensive, 16 easily covering
1
against a bankrupt on unexpired employment contracts. "
'In re Kieth-Gara Co., 203 Fed. 585 (E. D. Pa. 1913) ; In re Schechter,

39 F. (2d) 18 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1930); In re Pittsburg Drug Co., 64 Fed. 482
(W. D. Pa. 1908).

"Its re Garlington, 115 Fed. 999 (N. D. Tex. 1902) ; In re Gimbel, 294 Fed.
883 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923) ; In re Thompson, 144 Fed. 314 (W. D. Tex. 1906) ;
ef. British & American Mtg. Co. v. Stuart, 210 Fed. 425 (C. C. A. 5th, 1914)
(stipulation in mortgage due after the filing of the petition for the payment of
attorney's fees held not provable) ; First Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Stuppi,
2 F. (2d) 822 (C C. A. 8th, 1924) semble.
"It re Merrill & Baker, 186 Fed. 312 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1911) ; In re Kaplan,
44 F. (2d) 669 (N. D. Tex. 1930) ; In re Adair Realty & Trust Co., 35 F. (2d)
531 (N. D. Ga. 1929); Bibb Mfg. Co. v. Pope, 22 F. (2d) 557 (S. D. N. Y.
1925) ; In re Pettingill & Co., 137 Fed. 143 (D. Mass. 1905).
"'it re Lyons Beet Sugar Refining Co., 192 Fed. 445 (W. D. N. Y. 1911).
"Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n., 240 U. S. 581, 36 Sup.
Ct. 412, 60 L. ed. 811 (1916) (the court distinguishes claims for rent to accrue
after the filing of the petition as resulting from the "diversity between duties
which touch the realty, and the mere personalty," citing Co. Litt., 292, b, para
513) ; cf. Wells v. 21st St. Realty Co., supra note 8 (the court followed the
above distinction and refused to apply the doctrine of anticipatory breach to
rent to accrue after the filing of the petition).
""The test of provability under the act of 1898 may be stated thus: If the
bankrupt, at the time of the bankruptcy, by disenabling himself from performing the contract in question, and by repudiating its obligation, could give the
proving creditor the right to maintain at once a suit in which damages could
be assessed at law or in equity, then the creditor can prove in bankruptcy on
the ground that bankruptcy is the equivalent of disenablement and repudiation."
Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n., supra note 15 at 592.
'In re Schultz & Guthrie, 235 Fed. 907 (D. Mass. 1916); In re Rouden
Mfg. Co., 278 Fed. 663 (E. D. N. Y. 1921).
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The purpose of the present bankruptcy act is to discharge the
bankrupt from existing obligations and distribute his assets ratably
among his creditors.' 8 By construing subdivision (4) as independent of subdivision (1) the logic of the principal case would allow
proof of practically all contingent claims founded upon contract.
This construction seems to be in furtherance of the purpose of the
act, in that it allows these contingent claims to be proved and discharged. A meritorious limitation upon this broad rule is found in
the English bankruptcy act to the effect that the amount of the
damages be ascertainable with reasonable certainty. 19

F. D. HAMRICK,

JR.

Conflict of Laws-Validity of Foreign ContractsEffect of Domestic Usury Laws.
The receiver for a bankrupt North Carolina corporation sued the
defendant, a credit company, incorporated in Delaware with principal office in Baltimore, for tvice the amount of usurious interest
allegedly paid by the lumber company.' By a "covering agreement"
the lumber company "sold" and the credit company "bought" acceptable accounts, notes, drafts, and other paper taken from the
former's customers and mailed to defendant in Baltimore. Defendant advanced 77 per cent on acceptance and the balance when the
customer paid the lumber company as defendant's agent and the latter
remitted. If the customer did not pay, defendant served notice and
charged the amount back. For this and other services not deemed
material by the court, the credit company collected 1/30 of 1 per
cent of the net face value of accounts for each day, and other charges
amounting to 15 per cent. The contract stipulated that the law of
Delaware should govern, also that it was not to be effective until
accepted by defendant in Baltimore. (Corporations cannot take adCentral Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n., supra note 15 at 591;
Williams v. U. S. Fidelity Co., 236 U. S. 549, 554, 35 Sup. Ct. 289, 59 L. ed.
713 (1915).
"(1883) 46 & 47 VicT. c. 52, para. 37 (1) (3), 1 CHIT. STAT. 702; ef. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, 23 Sup. Ct. 757, 47 L. ed. 1084 (1903) (the con-

tract of a husband to pay his wife an annuity so long as she should remain a
widow held not a provable claim in bankruptcy because the value of the annuity
was so uncertain as to be incapable of estimation).
'N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §2306, provides that all interest is forfeited for charging usury, and twice the interest may be recovered for usurious
interest paid.

